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RECENT CASES
or attempt to remove an impounded vehicle without first paying the
costs of impoundment.
If a case similar to Remm arises in North Dakota, it appears
that the ordinances mentioned above 79 may be declared at least par-
tially invalid under the requirements of Fuentes v. Shevin.8 0 Although
Remm has questionable value as precedent in North Dakota, its ap-
plication of the Fuentes decision to the issue of prior notice and op-
portunity for a hearing before assessment of towing and storage fees
before return of an impounded vehicle is sound, and it is likely that
other courts will arrive at the same conclusion in scrutinizing simi-
lar ordinances. Although the impact of requiring due process in this
area is not a matter of life and death, it is significant to a vehicle
owner who may believe his! vehicle was impounded improperly.
TIMOTHY D. LERvICK
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-NEGLIGENCE-PSYCHOTHERAPIST HAS A
DUTY To WARN AN ENDANGERED VICTIM WHOSE PERIL WAS DISCLOSED
To PSYCHOTHERAPIST BY PATIENT
Plaintiffs, parents of a young woman murdered by a former men-
tal patient brought a wrongful death action against the regents of the
University of California, four university psychotherapists,' and five
policemen employed by the university. Prior to the woman's murder,
the patient, while in psychotherapy, had confided his intention to kill
a person readily identifiable as plaintiffs' daughter, but neither plain-
tiffs nor their daughter were warned of the patient's threats. Shortly
after learning of the patient's intention the psychotherapist, assisted
by the police, unsuccessfully tried to commit the patient. 2 Subse-
79. See ordinances cited in notes 58-66 supra.
80. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fieates has al'eady had an impact on North Dakota law. In
Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975), the court held that North
Dakota's prejudgment attachment procedure, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-01 (1976), was un-
constitutional because its provision for summary seizure did not meet the procedural safe-
guards standards established by Fitentes and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416'U.S. 600
(1974).
1. The psychotherapist defendants included Dr. Lawrence, the psychologist who exam-
ined the patient and determined that he should be committed; and Dr. Harvey Powelson,
chief of the department of psychiatry at the university, who rescinded Moore's decision
and directed that the staff at the hospital take no action to commit the patient. Tarasoff
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 430n.2, 551 P.2d 334, 340n.2, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14, 20n.2 (1976).
In this comment, the term psychotherapist will include psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
2. After Dr. Moore had determined that the patient should be committed, he wrote to
the campus police, requesting that they briefly detain the patient. The police talked to the
patient and upon his assurance that he would stay away from the young woman, they e-
leased him. Dr. Powelson then ordered the hospital staff to take no further action to com-
mit the patient. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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quently, the patient discontinued the psychotherapy. Two months la-
ter, he killed the plaintiffs' daughter. Plaintiffs contended that de-
fendants were negligent in failing to warn the victim and in not bring-
ing about the patient's confinement.3 The superior court sustained
defendant's demurrers, and the state court of appeals affirmed. In
reversing, the California Supreme Court held that when a psychother-
apist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should
have determined, that his patient poses a serious danger to another,
he is under a duty to warn the victim of the danger.4 Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 114 (1976).
Under general tort principles, a person is ordinarily under no ob-
ligation or duty either to control the conduct of another 5 or to warn
those endangered by such conduct. 6 However the courts have engraf-
ted an exception to this rule where "the defendant stands in some
special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be
controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that con-
duct." 7
Once this special relationship is established, affirmative duties,
including a duty to warn, may be imposed to prevent injury to third
persons. The defendant's conduct may be negligent, innocent or pro-
tected by governmental immunity, but as long as it contributes to the
danger to the plaintiff, a relationship arises which imposes a duty
to avoid further harm.8
The special relationships exception has traditionally been limited
to the parent-child 9 and master-servant0 relationships, and to those re-
lationships where one party has charge of an individual with danger-
ous propensities. 1 The courts have been reluctant to extend the boun-
daries of this exception beyond these established relationships. When
they have done so it has been the result of a serious and careful bal-
ancing of various competing social policy considerations.1
2
3. Id. at 432-33, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
4. Id. at 450, 551 P.2d at 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
5. See, e.g., Ri.hards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Wright v. Arcade
School Dist., 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1964); Scott v. McCrocklin,
- La.- 29 So'. 2d 619 (1947) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315, Comment
(1965).
6. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 56 at 341 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 315, Comment (1965).
7. Tarasoff %. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 23 (1976). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-320 (1965).
S. Sec, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1!)74) : 'Zylka v. Lelkvoll, 274 Minn. 435, 144 N.W.2d 358 (1966) ; Parrish
v. Atlantic (oast Line Ii. Co., 221 N.C. 292, 20 S.E.2d 299 (1942).
9. Ne, e.!., Ellis v. )'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953); RESTATE-
MFNT (SECOND) or ToRTS § 31'6 (1965) : Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct
of Aitoth c, 43 YALE I.J. S86, 893 95 (1934).
10. Naji.r v. Southern i'ac. Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 634, 13 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1961) ; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1;5) Harper & Kinhe, supra note 9, at 896-97.
11. Austin \V. Jones co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 A. 577 (1923) ; RESTATEMEN'T (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 319 (11965) Halper & Rime, supra note 9, at 897-98.
12. The major social policy considerations to be balanced are:
RECENT CASES
The most important consideration in establishing a duty to warn
is foreseeability. The existence of a duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect third persons is dependent upon whether the risk to be
guarded against is one which would normally be foreseen. 13 Thus,
courts have imposed a duty on hospitals to control the conduct of
their patients and have held them liable for violence perpetrated by
a patient against another where the danger to third persons is foresee-
able.
14
In University of Louisville v. Hammock,"5 the court found a hos-
pital to be liable to an injured patient, based on the hospital's actual
knowledge of the attacking patient's propensity for violence when
suffering from one of his bouts with delirium tremens. 16 The court
did, however, suggest that liability could be premised on the hospital's
and physician's constructive knowledge "that a person so afflicted
might reasonably be expected to become violent, uncontrollable, and
dangerous at any time.'
' 7
In Joachim v. State, 8 the court, relying on Hammock, recognized
that foreseeability of harm could be extended to third persons other
than fellow patients. 9 Although the court in Joachim appeared to
base its decision on the third person's status as an "invitee" of the




In Greenberg v. Barbour21 liability was imposed on a state men-
tal hospital's staff doctor when he failed to admit a person known to
entertain homicidal delusions and that person later assaulted the
pIaintiff. 22 The court in Greenberg appeared to find that the duty
of a psychotherapist to protect an endangered person is by no means
[T]he foreseeability of harm to . . . [the plaintiff], the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, [and] the policy of preventing future harm.
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
13. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d' 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) ; Z F. HARPERi
& F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS 1018 (1956).
14. In Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 469, 432 P.2d
193, 196, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (1967), the court stated:
[WV]here the hospital has notice or knowledge of facts from which it might
reasonably be concluded that a patient would be likely to harm himself or
others unless preclusive measures were taken, then the hospital must use
reasonable care in the circumstances to prevent such harm.
(emphasis added). See Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (1968) ; Wood v. Samaritan Inst., 26 Cal. 2d 847, 161 P.2d 556 (1945). CI.
Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
15. 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907).
16. Id. at -, 106 S.W. at 229.
17. Id. at - 106 S., at 220.
18. - Misc.- , 43 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Ct. Cl. 1943).
19. Id. at - , 43 N.Y.S.2d at 170. See '.Veihs v. State, 267 App. Div. 233, - , 45
N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (1943); Jones v. State, 267 App. Div. 254, -- , 45 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406
(1943).
20. -Misc.-, 43 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Ct. Cl. 1943).
21. 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
22. Id. at 746.
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limited to situations where there is a special relationship between the
therapist and the patient. 23 An even more compelling duty would
seem to arise once the dangerous person has been admitted for ther-
apy and a psychotherapist-patient relationship has been established.
The cases favoring recognition of a duty to control the danger-
ous person's conduct center on the defendant's actual or constructive
knowledge of the person's dangerous propensities. 24 However, where
a duty to warn third persons is sought to be imposed, the courts have
generally demanded that the defendant possess actual knowledge of
the person's dangerous tendencies.
25
In Bullock v. Parkchester General Hospital,26 the court stated
that the hospital and doctor would be liable for the patient's assault
on a nurse only if they had actual knowledge of the patient's danger-
ous condition.2 7 In declining to base liability on constructive know-
ledge, the court in Bullock expressed concern that such an imposition
would penalize physicians for errors in judgment.2 8 The court also
suggested that the physician's knowledge of the patient's specific
mental condition (psychosis) should not be translated into a duty
to know whether a tendency toward violence was predictable.
2 9
In Sealey v. Finkelstein,30 the court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment because plaintiff's evidence failed to estab-
lish that the physician had actual knowledge that the patient's condi-
tion was such that an assault might be expected to follow.3' In
Sealey, the court appeared to rely heavily on the fact that the patient
had never exhibited any "dangerous and vicious propensities" 2 prior
to the assault and; therefore, the physician could not accurately pre-
dict whether the patient would become violent.
The overwhelming evidence is that psychotherapists and psychia-
trists cannot reliably predict future violent behavior.3 3 The majority
23. Id. at 747. Of. Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Morgan v.
County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964).
24. See, e.g., Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17 (1952)
Benson v. State, - Misc.-- , 52 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
25. See, e.g., Stake v. Women's Div. Christian Serv., 73 N.M. 303, 387 P.2d 871 (1963)
Sealey v. Finkelstein, - Misc. 2d-, 206 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Bullock v.
Parkchester Gen. Hospital, 8 App. Div. 254, 160 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1957).
26. 3 App. Div. 2d 254, 160 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1957).
27. Id. at -, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
28. Id. at -, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 120, citing St. George v. State, 283 App. Div. 245, 127
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1954), where the court felt that an imposition of liability for errors in
judgment might lead to the unnecessary confinement of innocent individuals. See also
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 462, 551 P.2d 334, 354, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14, 41 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
29. 3 App. Div. 2d 254, -. 160 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (1957).
30. - Misc. 2d- , 206 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
81. Id. at -- , 206 N.Y.S.2d at 516. See Stake v. Women's Div. Christian Serv., 73
N.M. 303, 387 P.2d 871 (1963).
32. - Misc. 2d- , 206 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
33. Justice Douglas has said of the reliability of predicting future violent behavior that:
Predictions of dangerous behavior, no matter who makes them, are in-
credibly inaccurate, and there is a growing consensus that psychiatrists are
nct uniquely qualified to predict dangerous behavior and are, in fact, less
accurate in their predictions than other professionals.
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in Tarasoff recognized this difficulty as inherent in a determinative
process that is characterized by complexity and uncertainty,3 4 but
determined that it was only one factor in establishing the extent of
his duty to exercise reasonable care in protecting third persons from
his patient's violent acts. 35 The majority indirectly recognized one
of the important considerations in the Bullock" and Sealey37 deci-
sions when it noted that the therapist need not be perfect in his pre-
dictions of violence.3 8 However, while the court did not require per-
fection, it did require that the therapist exercise "that reasonable
degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exer-
cised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar
circumstances." 39
The court also acknowledged that the public interest in effective
treatment of mental illness and the importance of guarantying the
confidential character of psychotherapeutic communications 40 had
been recognized by the legislature in the form of a specific psycho-
therapist-patient privilege,4 1  but reasoned that "[t]he protective
privilege ends where the public peril begins.."
42
The distinctions made by Justice Clark, in dissent, appear to
center on the effect a duty to warn may have on the psychotherapeutic
privilege.43 Justice Clark was strongly concerned that, if the therapist
could no longer guarantee the confidentiality of a patient's commun-
ications, many people in need of treatment would be deterred from
Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 365n.2 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from a denial of certiorari). See, e.g., Cocozza & Steadman, Some Refinements in th e
Measnreeen ts (ind Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 131 AM. J. PSYCH. 1012 (1974)
Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1975)
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. RPv. 693, 711-16 (1975) : Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis
and Trecotnent of Dan gerousness, 18 CRIME & DEe.. 393 (1972) ; Steadman, Some Evidence
on the Inaccuracy of the Concept and Determination of Dangerousness in LxtiO & Psychia-
try, 1 J. PSYCH. & LAW 409 (1973) ; Wenk, Robinson & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?
18 CRIME & DEL. 393 (1972).
34. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438, 551 P.2d 334, 345, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1.976).
35. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
36. 3 App. Div. 254, 160 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1957).
37. -Misc. 2d- , 206 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
38. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438, 551 P.2d 934, 345, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976).
39. Id. at 438, 551 11.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25, quoting Bardessono v. Michels, 3
Cal. 1d 780, 788, 478 P.2d 4S0, 484, 91 Cal. Rptr. 760, 764 (1970). See also Quintal v.
Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1964); Lawless v.
Calaway, 24 Cal. 81, 147 P.2d 60e4 (1944).
40. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440, 551 P.2d 334, 346, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (11176).
41. CAL. EVeD. CODE § 1014 (Supp. 1976). MNassachusetts is thus far the only other state
that recognizes a similar i)SYclothleapit-latient priv'ilege. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
233 & 20B (Supp. 1976). N.I).I. Ey. 503 adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court on
Dec. 1, 1976, also receognizes the necessity )f this ptrivilege.
42. Tarasoff v. Rlegents ,ef Univ. of Cal., 17 (al. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14. 27 (1976). Sc also Simnlson v. Swenson, 101 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) ;
Munzer v. Blaislell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1944) : Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 191,
331 P.2d S14 (195).
43. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 458-60, 551 P.2d 334, 359-60.
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 39-40 (1976).
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seeking it 4 and that, without this assurance of confidentiality, patients
might repress violent thoughts with tragic consequences.4 5 However,
the dissent seems to have overlooked the most significant consider-
ation involved-the lives of possible victims that may be saved by
the creation of a duty to warn.
The incidence of mental illness in North Dakota is not as wide-
spread as in California. Nevertheless, the import of Tarasoff cannot
be completely overlooked by psychiatrists in North Dakota.
A question similar to the one posed in Tarasoff has been address-
ed by the federal courts in North Dakota. In Merchants National
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 46 a psychologist treating a dan-
gerous mental patient at a veteran's hospital was held to be negli-
gent in failing to bring evidence of the patient's mental condition
to the attention of the hospital personnel. 47 With such notice they
could have evaluated the evidence and presumably could have re-
fused to allow the patient to leave, thus possibly preventing the mur-
der that the patient committed shortly after his departure from the
hospital. While the court did not specifically rely upon a duty to warn
for its finding of liability, a fair reading of this decision does indicate
a possible basis for future rulings on this issue.
Violence is an ever-increasing and tragic consequence of mental
illness. Society has a right to demand protection from this violence
and the mentally ill have a concomitant right to psychotherapeutic
treatment. The therapist, however, is caught in the middle of this
struggle of rights. Since he is involved with potentially dangerous
individuals and is given the power to detain those suspected of being
dangerous,4S the public may tend to perceive him as an agent of so-
ciety whose duty is to protect society from the hidden danger confided
to him by his patients. The therapist is similarly seen as a confidant
by the patient in whom he can confide his deepest secrets. By im-
posing a duty to warn on the therapist only when the patient's con-
fidences reveal a preventable danger to a third person, the California
Supreme Court has provided a fair and equitable solution to the thera-
pist's dilemma.
KENT M. MORROW
CRIMINAL LAW-ENTRAPMENT-IF DEFENDANT IS PREDISPOSED To
COMMIT THE OFFENSE, No DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTS, EVEN
IF GOVERNMENT AGENT SUPPLIES THE CONTRABAND.
44. Id. at 459-60, 551 P.2d at 359-60, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40.
45. Id. at 459, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39. See also In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d
415, 426, 467 P.2d 557, 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1970).
46. 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
47. Id. at 418.
48. N D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08 (1970).
